Continuity despite crises: Germany's euro policy in the light of the pandemic, war and inflation

After a decade of reforming and stabilising the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it has been put to a triple test: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the return of inflation have posed serious challenges to the eurozone that call for policy responses. Against the background of recent advances in European integration theory, we assess whether and how these challenges have led to a change in the EMU policy of the eurozone's most powerful member, Germany. We conceptualise three ideal-typical policy options for Germany to deal with EMU's challenges and we search for traces of policy learning from past eurozone crisis management. On the basis of semi-structured interviews with German political elites, we cannot identify any significant change in Germany's EMU policy. We conclude that the unwavering continuity of Germany's euro policy makes further substantial integration in EMU unlikely. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of European Public Policy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

EU or Euro Area Crisis? Studying Differentiated Integration as an Idea Structuring Elite Perceptions of the Sovereign Debt and the COVID-19 crisis

After the sovereign debt crisis, scholars concluded that euro area member states (EAMS) and non-EAMS embarked on diverging paths of integration. Yet, their united response countering the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis contradicts the path-dependency argument. This article takes an ideational approach. It demonstrates that the different crisis outcomes regarding differentiated integration (DI) in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) coincide with variations of how DI influenced elite crisis perceptions as an idea. While policymakers perceived the sovereign debt crisis as a currency area crisis with threats and spillovers applying to EAMS, they interpreted the COVID-19 crisis as a health emergency threatening all EU member states. These differences in elite crisis perceptions facilitated different outcomes regarding DI despite unchanged economic and fiscal circumstances among EAMS and non-EAMS. The findings challenge deterministic assumptions on the self-reinforcing nature of DI in EMU and establish DI as an idea structuring elite perceptions. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of European Integration is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

The fiscal sovereignty of the European Union after the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine

NextGenerationEU, the recovery programme adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not provide the EU with fiscal sovereignty. Fiscal sovereignty remains under the control of the member states which are, however, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. Comparative federalism shows that central fiscal sovereignty requires granting the power to tax to the centre but without impairing the fiscal sovereignty of the units. The co-existence of two distinct, yet connected, fiscal sovereignties (EU and member states) would mean departing from the regulatory model of fiscal integration created with the Maastricht Treaty, and would thus require treaty change. Future research should perform a more thorough comparison between the EU and fiscally centralized and decentralized federations. Qualitative comparative analysis could complement process tracing and systematic content analysis to identify combinations of conditions that make the co-existence of fiscal sovereignties possible in consolidated federal polities – and still impossible in the EU. Books reviewed Paul Dermine (2022) The New Economic Governance of the Eurozone. A Rule of Law Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Federico Fabbrini (2022) EU Fiscal Capacity. Legal Integration After COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brady Gordon (2022) The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomasz P. Woźniakowski (2022) Fiscal Unions. Economic Integration in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of European Integration is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Une nouvelle solidarité européenne ?

La solidarité financière européenne en période de crise a été inscrite dans les traités dès les débuts de la construction européenne et a été mise en œuvre à partir des années 1970. Les instruments de solidarité mis en place, adaptés à des crises classiques, se sont avérés insuffisants pour faire face à une crise d'un genre nouveau telle que la crise de la Covid-19. L'Union européenne et l'Union économique et monétaire ont alors usé d'expédients pour manifester une solidarité de circonstance, qui a cependant ouvert la voie à une solidarité renforcée, sur le moyen terme, qui n'apparaît cependant pas pérenne.Alternate : European financial solidarity in times of crisis was enshrined in the treaties from the very beginnings of European construction and was implemented from the 1970s. The instruments of solidarity put in place, adapted to classic crises, have proven to be true insufficient to cope with a crisis of a new kind such as the covid-19 crisis. The European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union then used all the ingredients to show solidarity for the occasion, which however opened the way to reinforced solidarity in the medium term, which does not appear to be sustainable.

Introduction: democratic accountability in the EU economic governance post-crises: its many faces and potential outstanding gaps

The article introduces the special issue 'Parliaments in times of crises: democratic accountability in the EU economic governance from the euro to the COVID crisis' explaining how it seeks to make a novel contribution in the field of parliamentary studies. It first explains the trajectory of the crisis-driven institutional changes affecting parliaments from the great financial crisis to the COVID pandemic. It then introduces the concept of democratic accountability as a guiding notion of the special issue and differentiates among its various dimensions as well as potential outstanding gaps in the area of EU economic governance. Finally, it demonstrates in what ways particular contributions of this collection address the under-researched questions related to the abovementioned dimensions of EU democratic accountability.

The European Parliament in the Economic and Monetary Union after COVID: towards a slow empowerment?

The European Parliament (EP)'s role in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has always been rather limited. Its prerogatives were somewhat reinforced after the Euro crisis, but its role in policy implementation remained minimal. However, because of the pandemic, the level of integration at the supranational level has significantly increased as a result of, among others, the adoption of unique instruments such as the SURE instrument, Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). This article considers to what extent the EP's role in EMU has been reinforced as a result of these measures. It finds that the EP was regrettably reserved only a limited role in the operationalisation of the RRF and an even lesser role in other instruments, but that legal and political constraints made any other outcome unlikely. This article argues in favour of an increased use of the existing instruments by both the EP and national parliaments, as well as a reinforcement of interparliamentary cooperation. A far more extensive empowerment of the EP would be required if temporary and exceptional developments that occurred in the EMU during the pandemic were to become more entrenched.

Resilience in Focus. Certain Mechanisms of the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union

The economic resilience - the flexibility of the economy and also the capability of resistance to shocks - is a central category of European reform processes. It contains proactive and reactive dimension, as well as the necessity of adaptation to the new circumstances. The study examines the basic dimensions of resilience vulnerability factors, shock absorption and the ability to recover, and finds that the efficiency of the interactions and synergy of the deep integration system is determined by the interconnected mechanisms of convergence and resilience. Approaching resilience may show a new direction to national economic policies. With the increase of resilience of certain member states, the structural reforms at national level could decrease (reduce) the expense of the anti-cyclical (national fiscal or common monetary) policies in stabilizing of the Eurozone’s economies.

A New Role for the European Stability Mechanism in Post-COVID-19 EMU? Explaining the Failure of the Pandemic Crisis Support and Assessing Ways Forward

Since the establishment of the Pandemic Crisis Support, it has been hypothesized that the European Stability Mechanism might play a new role in stabilizing investments in the European Economic and Monetary Union through a targeted support for the financing of European public goods. The article inquires into the changes in the European Stability Mechanism’s institutional design that could make this possible. It starts by analyzing its lending policy, its accountability structure, and the structure of incentives that underlie negotiations at the Board of Governors. The article then explains the failure of the Pandemic Crisis Support against the background of a neo-institutionalist analysis of the two-level games that develop at intergovernmental fora, and does so through an investigation of the 2020 negotiations that led to the institution of the Pandemic Crisis Support, first, and the The Next Generation EU, later on. Finally, it illustrates which alterations in the institutional design of the European Stability Mechanism could represent a different, and more favorable, structure of incentives for lenders and borrowers.

Ten Years On, Two Crises Later: Evaluating EMU Institutional Reforms Since 2010

The article systematically reviews EMU governance reforms implemented, policy instruments introduced and further institutional reforms currently under discussion with a view of how far they have addressed the institutional shortcomings of the euro-area architecture, which have led to the euro crisis of 2010ff. It further explores how far these reforms have helped to prevent a replay of that crisis when the COVID-19 pandemic hit the euro area. To this end, the article first reviews the academic debate about the causes of the euro crisis that started with the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. In a second step, it evaluates the reforms implemented since the onset of the euro crisis and during the COVID-19 crisis with regard in how far these reforms have addressed or could address the causes of the crisis and gives an outlook on potential forthcoming problems.

The Parliamentary Accountability of EMU Decisions: Between Informality and Fragmentation

This Article compares the democratic accountability mechanisms in place in the area of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with those existing in other fields of EU law. In so doing, it shows that, although democratic accountability standards have generally been improved following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, important shortcomings still exist as a result of institutional flaws and practice in EU decision-making. It then shows that the accountability gap that exists in the field of EMU is even deeper owing to the complexity of the procedures in place, and to the informality that characterises some of them as well as some of the decision-making bodies involved (chief of which is the Eurogroup). The Article concludes by making some proposals to improve the current unsatisfactory situation, improvement which will be ever more necessary in post-Covid times.

Centrifugal forces in a hegemonic environment: the rise of small-state coalitions in the Economic and Monetary Union

A hegemonic power can guarantee the status quo in an international economic system. However, domestic or international changes may unsettle a hegemon’s priorities. In such phases, smaller states benefiting from the existing system may fear that the hegemon will fail to keep the system stable. How do they react if they lose trust in the hegemon’s ability or will to maintain the status quo? This article argues that in such cases, free riding becomes less rewarding. Therefore, smaller states build publicly visible coalitions to ‘voice’ their preferences. Applying this argument to the role of small ‘creditor states’ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the article draws on original in-depth interviews to analyze the ‘New Hanseatic League’ as a strategy to defend the present euro regime and counterbalance the Franco–German tandem. By elaborating and tracing a fine-grained causal mechanism, the article thus explains the emergence of vocal small-state coalitions in a hegemonic environment.

Walking the Tightrope: Politicization and the Commission's Enforcement of the SGP*

Recent research indicates that bottom-up EU politicization shapes top-down EU policy enforcement, yet leaves open questions on the pervasiveness of these effects in policy areas that are depoliticized by design. This contribution asks how societal EU politicization shaped the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact up until its COVID-19-induced suspension. It employs causal process-tracing to analyse fiscal rule enforcement under varying levels and constellations of EU politicization. Results indicate that enforcement by the European Commission is shaped both by mandate and exogenous pressures created by politicization and the reputational concerns they induce. Moreover, politicization has gradually pushed the Commission towards increasingly flexible enforcement of EU fiscal rules. These conclusions are relevant because they show that politicization permeates even the most depoliticized areas of EU policy. Additionally, they suggest that the SGP's COVID-19-induced suspension can be understood as a continuation of existing enforcement strategies.

The one health landscape in Sub-Saharan African countries.

OBJECTIVES: One Health is transiting from multidisciplinary to transdisciplinary concepts and its viewpoints should move from 'proxy for zoonoses', to include other topics (climate change, nutrition and food safety, policy and planning, welfare and well-being, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), vector-borne diseases, toxicosis and pesticides issues) and thematic fields (social sciences, geography and economics). This work was conducted to map the One Health landscape in Africa. METHODS: An assessment of existing One Health initiatives in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries was conducted among selected stakeholders using a multi-method approach. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to One Health initiatives were identified, and their influence, interest and impacts were semi-quantitatively evaluated using literature reviews, questionnaire survey and statistical analysis. RESULTS: One Health Networks and identified initiatives were spatiotemporally spread across SSA and identified stakeholders were classified into four quadrants. It was observed that imbalance in stakeholders' representations led to hesitation in buying-in into One Health approach by stakeholders who are outside the main networks like stakeholders from the policy, budgeting, geography and sometimes, the environment sectors. CONCLUSION: Inclusion of theory of change, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and tools for standardized evaluation of One Health policies are needed for a sustained future of One Health and future engagements should be outputs- and outcomes-driven and not activity-driven. National roadmaps for One Health implementation and institutionalization are necessary, and proofs of concepts in One Health should be validated and scaled-up. Dependence on external funding is unsustainable and must be addressed in the medium to long-term. Necessary policy and legal instruments to support One Health nationally and sub-nationally should be implemented taking cognizance of contemporary issues like urbanization, endemic poverty and other emerging issues. The utilization of current technologies and One Health approach in addressing the ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 and other emerging diseases are desirable. Finally, One Health implementation should be anticipatory and preemptive, and not reactive in containing disease outbreaks, especially those from the animal sources or the environment before the risk of spillover to human.